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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Lars Rodriguez appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction for felony
driving under the influence of alcohol ("a DUI") and other offenses related to a car accident.
Mr. Rodriguez went to trial, and he testified that he was the passenger, not the driver, in the
accident. On cross-examination, the district court allowed the State to elicit testimony that
Mr. Rodriguez had a prior felony conviction. The jury found Mr. Rodriguez guilty.
On appeal, Mr. Rodriguez argues the district court abused its discretion by admitting
evidence of the fact of his prior felony conviction. He contends the nature of the prior conviction,
a DUI, was not relevant to the character for untruthfulness, and, as such, the district court should
have excluded the fact of his conviction. Due to this discretionary error, Mr. Rodriguez
respectfully requests the Court vacate the district court's judgment of conviction and remand this
case for a new trial.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State filed a criminal complaint alleging Mr. Rodriguez committed the crimes of a
felony DUI, leaving the scene of an accident, failure to notify upon striking a fixture, and
possession of an open container. (R., pp.13-17.) The State also alleged the persistent violator
sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.13, 15.) After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate judge found
probable cause for the offenses and bound Mr. Rodriguez over to district court. (R., pp.22, 23.)
The State filed a three-part information charging Mr. Rodriguez with these offenses and the
sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.24-33.) Mr. Rodriguez pled not guilty and went to trial.
(R., pp.34-35, 52-58.)
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At trial, the State called two eyewitnesses from the accident. They both testified that they
were driving together when they saw a red truck come up behind them. (Tr., p.154, L.23-p.155,
L.9, p.183, L.21-p.184, L.8, p.185, Ls.13-21.) They saw the red truck swerve around them, go
through a red light, and hit another car. (Tr., p.155, Ls.5-9, p.157, L.15-p.158, L.10, p.185,
L.13-p.186, L.23.) They further testified that the truck came to a stop on a curb and hit a fire
hydrant. (Tr., p.158, Ls.11-13, p.158, Ls.18-21, p.186, L.24-p.187, L.3.) They both testified that
they saw only one person in the truck: Mr. Rodriguez. (Tr., p.159, L.24-p.160, L.9, p.161, Ls.821, p.187, Ls.20-24, p.188, Ls.18-25, p.190, Ls.3-8.) They testified that they saw
Mr. Rodriguez get out of the driver's side of the car, and they followed him in their car as he fled
the scene. (Tr., p.160, L.10-17, p.161, L.25-p.168, L.22, p.189, Ls.10-24, p.190, L.9-p.193,
L.17.)
The State also called two police officers. One officer testified that, after responding to the
scene and looking for the driver, the eyewitnesses flagged him down and gave him information
about the driver's location. (Tr., p.208, Ls.1-19, p.209, L.4-p.210, L.7.) Shortly thereafter, the
officer located Mr. Rodriguez. (Tr., p.210, L.25-p.212, L.4.) This officer also testified that
Mr. Rodriguez's blood alcohol concentration level was .219. (Tr., p.218, Ls.5-8.) The second
officer testified about his investigation of the accident. (Tr., p.230, Ls.16-22.) The officer
testified that the driver's side door was ajar and the passenger's side door was closed when he
arrived at the scene. (Tr., p.234, Ls.5-20.) Two photographs of the truck from the accident
showed an open passenger side door, and the officer testified that he opened the door to see if
anyone was inside. (State's Exs. 5, 6; Tr., p.242, L.14-p.24, L.15.)
After the State rested, Mr. Rodriguez informed the district court that he intended to testify
in his defense. (Tr., p.246, L.25-p.247, L.2.) Mr. Rodriguez moved to exclude evidence of his
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three prior felony convictions under Idaho Rules of Evidence (I.RE.) 609 and 403. (Tr., p.247,
Ls.2-5.) These convictions were a 2017 felony DUI conviction, a 2014 felony DUI conviction,
and a 2001 felony eluding conviction. (Tr., p.250, Ls.11-21.) Mr. Rodriguez argued the prior
DUI convictions were not relevant to a character for truthfulness. (Tr., p.248, Ls.1-13.) He
further argued his other conviction for eluding was over

and did not show an

untruthful character either. (Tr., p.248, L.14-p.249, L.4.) The State asserted the prior DUI
convictions were relevant to truthfulness. (Tr., p.249, Ls.12-13.) The State also argued:
They're more probative and prejudicial because they're very similar to what he's
being charged with here, but he also knows the effects of those since he's been
convicted of those. That may sway whether or not he's going to testify truthfully
here. I think the jury needs to know about those priors to better evaluate his
testimony.
(Tr., p.249, Ls.13-20.) Mr. Rodriguez responded the State's argument was "propensity," that
"[h]e did it before, therefore, he's done it again," (Tr., p.250, Ls.4-10.) The district court
identified I.R.E. 609(a) as the applicable rule and took each conviction in turn. (Tr., p.250, L.22p.215, L.19.) The district court ruled:
So turning to the first felony. That's the 2017 driving under the influence
conviction. That -- going through the rule here the fact of the conviction is
relevant to the witness's character for truthfulness. And the fact is because it is a
prior felony conviction. It's something the jury should know. If Mr. Rodriguez is
going to put his credibility at issue by taking the stand to testify, the jury in
fairness should know that he is a convicted felon because that's essentially import
[sic], the thrust of Rule 609. That's legitimate impeachment.
(Tr., p.251, L.20-p.252, L.5.) Although the district court ruled the fact of the felony conviction
was relevant, the district court ruled the "nature of the felony is not relevant to his credibility."
(Tr., p.252, Ls.5-7.) The district court determined the nature of the felony (a DUI) would only be
relevant to "propensity, which is an improper method of proving a case, so that's clearly not
something that should be admitted." (Tr., p.252, Ls.9-11.) The district court also determined the
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"minimal" probative value was outweighed "in the extreme" by the unfair prejudice under I.R.E.
609(a) and 403. (Tr., p.252, Ls.16-20.) In light of this ruling, the district court advised the State
that it could ask Mr. Rodriguez if he had been previously convicted of a felony without stating
the nature of the felony. (Tr., p.253, Ls.6-11.) On the second conviction for a DUI in 2014, the
district court excluded that one in full. (Tr., p.254, Ls.2-23.) The district court determined:
It's the same analysis under 609 and 403. But that one is going to be excluded.
And the reason it's going to be excluded -- and I'm not going to restate all the
reasons about propensity. The reason it's going to be excluded is that it's not
necessary to pile on. In other words, in order for the jury to understand that
Mr. Rodriguez has perhaps diminished credibility it is sufficient for them to know
he is a convicted felon. It is not necessary for them to know he's a twice
convicted felon. And my concern with that second felony is again with
propensity. They start to think, oh, he's a criminal. He commits crimes. Let's
convict him of these crimes instead of analyzing the evidence.
So it is fair to both sides that Mr. Rodriguez be asked, You are a convicted
felon. Correct? Or You've been previously convicted of a felony. Correct? And
answer yes if that's his choice, and then move on. But we don't need two. That
would be unfair, and that would tip the scale under Rule 403. It would be unfair
prejudice and move into propensity.
(Tr., p.254, Ls.3-23.) On the third conviction for eluding in 2001, the district court excluded that
one in full as well because, again, the probative value was substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. (Tr., p.254, L.24-p.255, L.25.)
In his defense, Mr. Rodriguez testified that he was in the passenger seat of the truck, and
his roommate was driving at the time of the accident. (Tr., p.261, Ls.12-17, p.262, L.23-p.264,
L.15, p.275, L.24-p.276, L.1.) After the accident, Mr. Rodriguez testified that he exited the truck
from the passenger side. (Tr., p.267, L.6.) He admitted to leaving the scene. (Tr., p.267, Ls.1219, p.269, Ls.1-20, p.280, Ls.3-5.) Mr. Rodriguez also testified that the eyewitnesses could not
have seen inside the truck because the windows were illegally tinted. (Tr., p.272, L. l 7-p.273,
L.3.) On cross-examination, Mr. Rodriguez admitted to drinking alcohol that day with his
roommate. (Tr., p.277, L.12-p.278, L.2.) He also told the prosecutor that he could not give him
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the name of his roommate because he would get in trouble and get "beat up." (Tr., p.278, Ls.324.) As the fmal question in cross-examination, the prosecutor asked: ''Now, Mr. Rodriguez,
you've previously been convicted of a felony. Right?" and Mr. Rodriguez answered, "Yes, sir, I
have." (Tr., p.283, Ls.21-23.)
The jury found Mr. Rodriguez guilty of a DUI, leaving the scene of an accident, failure to
notify upon striking a fixture, and possession of an open container. (Tr., p.332, L. l 6-p.333, L.11;
R., pp.60-61.) Mr. Rodriguez admitted to two prior DUis and felony eluding for the felony DUI
and the persistent violator enhancements (Tr., p.334, L.25-p.341, L.7.) The district court
sentenced him to an aggregate sentence of twenty-six years, with six years fixed. (Tr., p.416,
Ls.9-18; R., pp.99-100, 104-06, 107-10.) Mr. Rodriguez timely appealed. (R., pp.111-13.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of the fact of Mr. Rodriguez's
prior felony conviction to show untruthfulness when the nature of the conviction had no bearing
on that character trait?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Evidence Of The Fact Of
Mr. Rodriguez's Prior Felony Conviction To Show Untruthfulness When Nature Of The
Conviction Had No Bearing On That Character Trait

A.

Introduction
Mr. Rodriguez argues the district court abused its discretion by allowing the State to

present evidence of the fact of his prior felony conviction to show a character for untruthfulness.
The district court determined the fact of a felony conviction alone, without any consideration of
the category of the offense, was relevant to attack a witness's character for truthfulness.
Mr. Rodriguez submits this was an incorrect application of the legal standards. The category of
the conviction, not the mere fact of one, controls whether the prior conviction is relevant to show
a person's untruthful character. The district court failed to conduct that inquiry. Moreover, if
properly examined, a DUI conviction has no bearing on a person's truthfulness. Therefore, the
district should not have allowed the State to elicit any testimony on Mr. Rodriguez's prior felony
conviction. Due to this discretionary error, Mr. Rodriguez respectfully requests the Court vacate
the district court's judgment of conviction and remand his case for a new trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews questions regarding the admissibility of evidence using a
mixed standard of review. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143 (2008). First,
whether the evidence is relevant is a matter of law that is subject to free review.
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 569 (2007). Second, [the Court] review[s] the
district court's determination of whether the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect for an abuse of discretion. Stevens, 146 Idaho at
143.

State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 907 (2015). To determine whether the district court abused its
discretion, the Court considers four factors:

7

Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).

C.

The District Court Did Not Apply The Correct Legal Standards Because It Did Not
Consider Whether The Nature Of Prior Conviction Was Relevant To Truthfulness And, If
Properly Considered, Should Have Excluded The Fact Of The Prior Conviction
"Idaho Rule of Evidence 609 allows prior felony convictions to be used to impeach a

witness's credibility when the conviction is relevant to credibility and the probative value of the
evidence does not outweigh the prejudicial effect." State v. Capone, 164 Idaho 118, 126 (2018).
The rule states:
For the purpose of attacking a witness's character for truthfulness, evidence of the
fact that the witness has been convicted of a felony and the nature of the felony
must be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public record, but
only if the court determines in a hearing outside the presence of the jury that the
fact of the prior conviction or the nature of the prior conviction, or both, are
relevant to the witness's character for truthfulness and that the probative value of
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the party offering the witness. If
the evidence of the fact of a prior felony conviction, but not the nature of the
conviction, is admitted for impeachment of a party to the action or proceeding, the
party has the option to present evidence of the nature of the conviction, but
evidence of the circumstances of the conviction is not admissible.
I.R.E. 609(a). To determine the admissibility of evidence of a prior conviction, "courts apply a
two-step approach .... " Capone, 164 Idaho at 126. The Court must determine, first, "whether
the evidence is relevant to the credibility of the witness," and, second, whether the probative
value outweighs the prejudicial effect. Id.
Here, Mr. Rodriguez takes issue with the district court's analysis on the first step of the
test for his 2017 DUI conviction. The district court determined the fact of this conviction was
relevant to Mr. Rodriguez's credibility. Although the district court did not admit the nature of the
conviction, Mr. Rodriguez argues the district court's decision to allow the fact of the conviction
8

was nonetheless a discretionary error. He contends the district court did not apply the correct
legal standards because the nature of the conviction, which lacks any bearing on credibility,
precludes the admission of the fact of the prior conviction to attack Mr. Rodriguez's character for
truthfulness.
In the first step of admissibility under I.R.E. 609(a), "[t]he determination whether
evidence of a particular felony conviction is relevant to credibility depends on the particular facts
and circumstances of each case and must therefore be decided on a case-by-case basis." Id.
(quoting State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 30 (1997)). '"[A]ttacking the credibility of the witness'
means attacking the credibility of the witness on the basis that he has a certain kind of criminal
nature that renders him untrustworthy." State v. Kubat, 158 Idaho 661, 665 (Ct. App. 2015).
To guide this determination on credibility, the Court has identified three categories of
felony convictions. The first category are crimes "intimately connected to a person's veracity and
credibility," such as perjury. State v. Grist, 152 Idaho 786, 789 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing State v.

Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 580 (1981)). The second category are crimes "like robbery and burglary"
that "are somewhat less relevant to credibility because they do not deal directly with veracity and
have only a general relationship with honesty." Id. (citing Ybarra, 102 Idaho at 580). "Offenses
in the third category, which include crimes of passion and acts of violence that are the product of
emotional impulse, have been said to have little or no direct bearing on honesty and veracity." Id.
(citing Ybarra, 102 Idaho at 580-81; State v. Allen, 113 Idaho 676,678 (Ct. App. 1987)).
As a case-by-case inquiry, the district court must explain why the prior conviction was
(or was not) relevant to credibility. The district court should "make a record of its reasons for
concluding that a felony conviction for any particular crime is relevant to the credibility of the
witness with respect to whom the evidence is being adduced." State v. Franco, 128 Idaho 815,
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818 (Ct. App. 1996). For example, in Capone, the Court held the district court erred by
excluding witnesses' prior felony convictions for burglary because "the district court did not
explain why the burglary convictions were not relevant to credibility." 164 Idaho at 127.
Similarly, in Franco, the Court of Appeals held the district court erred by admitting a prior
felony conviction for the sale of heroin because the district court did not make "a determination
of the relevancy of the felony conviction to credibility." 128 Idaho at 818.
In this case, the district court failed to apply the correct legal standards because it did not
engage in the proper inquiry for the relevancy of Mr. Rodriguez's DUI conviction to his
credibility. The district court determined the prior DUI conviction was relevant to credibility for
the sole reason that it was a prior felony conviction. Again, the district court stated:
So turning to the first felony. That's the 2017 driving under the influence
conviction. [G]oing through the rule here the fact of the conviction is relevant to
the witness's character for truthfulness. And the fact is because it is a prior felony
conviction. It's something the jury should know. If Mr. Rodriguez is going to put
his credibility at issue by taking the stand to testify, the jury in fairness should
know that he is a convicted felon because that's essentially import [sic], the thrust
of Rule 609. That's legitimate impeachment.
(Tr., p.251, L.20-p.252, L.5.) This was not a proper explanation of why the DUI conviction, in
particular, was relevant to Mr. Rodriguez's credibility. The presence of a prior felony conviction,
in and of itself, is not automatically relevant to credibility. If that were true, the Court would not
have divided crimes into three categories and required findings by the district court on the
relevancy of the offense to credibility. Moreover, the language of I.R.E. 609(a) would reflect a
per se rule on the admission of the fact of a prior felony conviction. Clearly, I.R.E. 609(a) does
not have a per se rule, and the district court must examine the nature of the conviction to
determine whether the conviction is relevant to attacking a witness's truthfulness. The district
court did not do that here. It assumed the fact of the conviction alone rendered it automatically

relevant to Mr. Rodriguez's character for truthfulness. Therefore, the district court did not apply
the correct legal standards to determine the admissibility of Mr. Rodriguez's prior conviction.
See Capone, 164 Idaho at 127; Franco, 128 Idaho at 818.
If properly considered, the nature of Mr. Rodriguez's conviction was not relevant to

attacking his character for truthfulness. "Evidence is relevant if it has 'any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence."' State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 228
(2007) (quoting I.R.E. 401). Mr. Rodriguez asserts Dills are category three offenses. They do
not fall under category one, because they are not "intimately connected" to veracity and
credibility, and they do not fall under category two, because they do not even have "a general
relationship with honesty." Grist, 152 Idaho at 789. Category two crimes, such as robbery,
larceny, and burglary, "disclose a disregard for the rights of others" since "the witness had no
compunction against stealing another's property or taking it away by physical threat or force."
Ybarra, 102 Idaho at 581 (citation omitted). That type of character "might reasonably be

expected to express itself in giving false testimony whenever it would be to the advantage of the
witness." Id. (citation omitted). A DUI plainly does not show that same disregard for another's
rights. Unlike robbery or burglary, a DUI does not "establish a pattern of disrespect for law and
lawful authority." Allen, 113 Idaho at 678. Moreover, the Court has held a drug transaction
offense "in and of itself is not probative of whether a person is truthful or untruthful." State v.
Fernandez, 124 Idaho 381, 383 (1993); see also State v. Konechny, 134 Idaho 410, 421 (Ct. App.

2000) ("no abuse of discretion in the trial court's exclusion of evidence that the victims' father
had been convicted of possession of controlled substances"). A DUI is even less probative on
credibility than a drug offense because it is not illegal to possess or consume alcohol. Further, the
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Court of Appeals has upheld a district court's ruling that a witness's two prior DUI convictions
were not "indicative oflack of credibility" and without "probative value." State v. Barcella, 135
Idaho 191, 201 (Ct. App. 2000). The Court of Appeals held, "The district court's ruling was
consistent with I.R.E. 609(a), which prohibits the admission of prior convictions that are not
relevant to credibility." Id. For all of these reasons, although a DUI is "punished by the law," the
conduct of a DUI "does not bear directly on honestly or veracity." Allen, 113 Idaho at 678
(holding the crime of incest fell in the third category). A DUI falls in category three and is not
relevant to witness's character for truthfulness.
As such, the district court failed to apply the correct legal standards because it still
allowed the jury to learn of the fact of Mr. Rodriguez's prior felony conviction, even though the
nature of the conviction had no bearing on credibility. After ruling that the fact of the conviction
was relevant simply because it was a felony, the district court ruled: "However, the nature of the
felony is not relevant to his credibility.... [The DUI] charge would be relevant to propensity,
which is an improper method of proving a case .... " (Tr., p.252, Ls.5-10.) This was an incorrect
application of the legal standards. Once the district court determined the nature of the conviction
was "not relevant" to Mr. Rodriguez's credibility, the district court should have excluded both
the fact and nature of Mr. Rodriguez's prior conviction. At that point, neither was relevant to
attack Mr. Rodriguez's character for truthfulness.
In summary, the district court abused its discretion in two ways. First, it failed to apply
the correct legal standards by interpreting I.R.E. 609(a) to allow the admission of the fact of
Mr. Rodriguez's prior felony conviction simply because, "[i]f Mr. Rodriguez is going to put his
credibility at issue by taking the stand to testify, the jury in fairness should know that he is a
convicted felon." (Tr., p.252, Ls.1-3.) Second, it failed to apply the correct legal standards
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because, despite a DUI being a category three offenses, and despite the court's ruling that the
DUI was not relevant to credibility, the district court permitted the State to elicit testimony on
Mr. Rodriguez's prior felony conviction.
These discretionary errors require the vacation of Mr. Rodriguez's conviction and a
remand for a new trial. Upon learning Mr. Rodriguez was a convicted felon, the jury was able to
make a finding on his lack of credibility when it should not have. What is more, the fact of his
prior felony conviction was inherently prejudicial as evidence of propensity. The evidence of the
prior conviction invited the jury to infer that, if Mr. Rodriguez committed that offense, he must
have committed the instant offenses too. See State v. Folk, 157 Idaho 869, 878 (Ct. App. 2014)
("Folk's prior convictions are merely propensity evidence that allow persons to infer that if Folk
committed the prior offenses, he must have committed the offense at issue."). Because of these
inferences on untruthfulness and propensity, the State will be unable to show, beyond a
reasonable doubt, the district court's abuse of discretion was harmless. See State v. Garcia, 166
Idaho 661, 462 P.3d 1125, 1137-40 (2020) (clarifying and applying harmless error standard to
evidentiary error). Thus, Mr. Rodriguez respectfully requests the Court vacate the district court's
judgment of conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Rodriguez respectfully requests this Court vacate the district court's judgment of
conviction and remand this case for a new trial.
DATED this 15 th day of December, 2020.

Isl Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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